GMU Econ alum Dominic Pino tells why he’s not so impressed with Trump’s ‘win’ over Colombia. Two slices:
The U.S. has a trade agreement with Colombia, signed in 2006. This agreement was one in a wave of similar agreements between the U.S. and countries in South and Central America. Since the end of the Bush administration, the U.S. has let its commercial relationships within its own hemisphere languish, and China has taken the opportunity to burnish its trading ties with those countries. The U.S. should be seeking to undo China’s advances and deepen its ties with Latin America, and the appointment of a secretary of state, Marco Rubio, who is fluent in Spanish and prioritized Latin America during his time in the Senate is an encouraging sign on that front. But if the U.S. is going to treat Colombia this way, despite a long-standing trade agreement and official status as a major non-NATO ally, it could deter other Latin American countries from taking any U.S. commitments seriously.
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The president’s power to unilaterally impose tariffs on all goods from an entire country is constitutionally questionable. Article I clearly gives the power to impose tariffs to Congress, though Congress has delegated this power to the president through several laws over many years. It did so under the assumption that presidents would seek to increase U.S. market access abroad and use tariffs sparingly to achieve that goal, which they did for decades. Congress was wrong to delegate that power in the way that it has, it should take that power back, and constitutional conservatives should not cheer for constitutional abuse.
My intrepid Mercatus Center colleague, Veronique de Rugy, calls for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to be abolished. A slice:
Picture this: a government agency that operates with little accountability, spends taxpayers’ money without congressional oversight, and enforces regulations based on flimsy theories about consumer behavior. That’s the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), an institution so misguided in both mission and execution that it does not deserve mere reform—it should be abolished outright.
Heralded as the savior of consumers after the 2008 financial crisis, the CFPB has instead become a regulatory monster that stifles innovation and drives up costs for the very people it claims to protect.
Jay Cost decries the imperial presidency.
Cliff Holderness’s letter in today’s Wall Street Journal is excellent:
Robert Rubin’s op-ed “The Limits of ‘Running Government Like a Business’” (Jan. 18) misses the key difference between the private and public sectors: The decision-makers in each have different incentives.
The essence of private property is that decision rights—and the wealth effects of exercising those rights—are vested in the same person. If Mr. Rubin made value-decreasing decisions as head of Goldman Sachs, the value of his holdings would have declined, as would have the wealth of his fellow partners. If his management didn’t improve, he would have been replaced. Owners of private property ultimately have to eat their own cooking.
Government officials, by contrast, seldom bear the wealth consequences of their actions. Indeed, in many instances this is prohibited by law. Mr. Rubin’s decisions as Treasury secretary doubtless caused greater wealth effects than his decisions at Goldman, but he personally bore few of the consequences. This doesn’t mean one system of incentives is better than the other—but it does mean the incentives are different in each and that what works in the private sector may not work in the public.
GMU Econ alum Alex Nowrasteh explains “how the Trump administration can obstruct future government attempts to reestablish affirmative action and DEI policies.”
